

Judicial Policy in the Law on Public Officers

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This Comment explores the role of the Supreme Court in molding public policy in the law on public officers. Specifically, the Comment is broken down into three parts, each exploring the effect of an influential Supreme Court decision from the year 2001.

Part I is an in-depth look at executive immunity as ruled in *Estrada v. Arroyo*, Part II is a review of the Court's response to the delay in the disposition of cases pending before courts of all levels in *In re Laoagan*, and Part III examines the case of *Lacson v. Perez* concerning the various *habeas corpus* petitions which were filed after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion.

The Author maintains that the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions were correct both in their rationale and result. The main issue in the three cases was the validity of the actions of three different public officers.

The Author posits that the cases effectively recognized the errors of public officers and dealt appropriate sanctions upon them (with exception to the *Lacson* case which was rendered moot by President Arroyo's lifting of the state of rebellion).

The Author concludes by noting that the Court's duty is to interpret the law and to act as the final arbiter of all disputes — while some case decisions may have the appearance of taking judicial governance, the Court must not be remiss in its duty to limit its authority to the proper application of the law.